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AFTER ABOLITION: THE PRESENT STATE OF
THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN MONTANA
Jeanne Matthews Bender
I. INTRODUCTION
A successful insanity' plea tends to generate publicity far in
excess of its importance in the criminal law.2 The acquittal of John
Hinckley focused public concern on the use of insanity as a crimi-
nal defense. Millions of television viewers saw Hinckley shoot Pres-
ident Reagan and three other men. Many were outraged when
Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity.' Because of
this and several other well-publicized cases, a number of states are
reevaluating their treatment of the insanity defense.4
In Montana Hinckley could very well have been found guilty.
In 1979 the legislature passed "An Act To Abolish The Defense Of
Mental Disease Or Defect In Criminal Actions And To Provide An
Alternative Sentencing Procedure .... -5 Under this law, "sanity"
may be considered at sentencing, but only evidence as to whether a
defendant had the required mental state is admissible during the
guilt phase of the trial.
The Act failed to abolish the insanity defense entirely. This
comment attempts to delineate the boundaries of the collection of
defenses now included within the rubric of mental disease or de-
fect. A clear need exists for legislative and judicial action to elimi-
nate ambiguities in the interpretation and application of current
law.
1. "Insanity defense" is a popular name for the defenses under which a criminal de-
fendant claims that he was incapable of forming intent or mental state due to some mental
defect or illness. In this comment the terms "mental disease or defect" and "insanity" are
used interchangeably.
2. The insanity defense succeeds infrequently. A 1978 study revealed 1600 acquittals
on the basis of insanity out of a total of two million criminal prosecutions. Fullin, The In-
sanity Defense: Ready for Reform?, Wis. B. BULL., Dec. 1982, at 13. Some of the reasons for
its infrequent assertion are that it is complicated to gather expert testimony; the defendant
must admit committing the act, denying only mental state; and success results in commit-
ment to a mental institution. A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 24
(1970). See also A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 24 (1967).
3. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981). For a discussion of
popular reaction to the Hinckley verdict as well as other recent cases involving the insanity
plea, see W. WINSLADE & J. Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA (1983).
4. See Comment, The Insanity Defense-A Review of Recent Statutory Changes, 3 J.
LEGAL MED. 617, 619 (1982).
5. Act of May 14, 1979, ch. 713, 1979 Mont. Laws 1979. The Act amended the laws by
removing the test for mental disease or defect, eliminating all reference to mental disease or
defect as an affirmative defense, and making certain procedural changes. See infra note 29.
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. In General
In early common law most criminal offenses were strict liabil-
ity offenses. As the concept of mens rea6 developed, the law
evolved to accommodate the insane defendant. Exculpation on the
grounds of mental disease or insanity was rooted in the Christian
moral notion that man was given free will to choose good over evil.
If a person's freedom of choice was impaired by mental disease, he
should not be held accountable for his acts. When a defendant
claimed that mental disease excused him, juries judged his mental
state using current popular notions of insanity.7
Insanity was primarily a legal concept, not a scientific one. As
the study of human behavior advanced, it became apparent that
more objective tests for insanity were possible and desirable. One
such test was developed when Daniel M'Naghten was acquitted by
reason of insanity after he attempted to assassinate the British
Prime Minister in 1843. The queen and the public were so out-
raged that the judges of the common law courts announced
M'Naghten's Rules.' The Rules stated that, in order to establish a
defense of insanity, a defendant must prove that, at the time of the
crime, he either did not know the "nature and quality" of his act,
or he did not know that it was wrong." It was no longer possible to
base a defense on testimony of a few witnesses who thought the
defendant was insane.' 0
The M'Naghten test is basically a cognitive test, but "know"
has been broadly construed by most courts.1 To answer critics
who held that M'Naghten did not allow for mental diseases affect-
ing only self-control, many jurisdictions added the "irresistible im-
pulse" test to M'Naghten. This test implies "knowledge of right
and wrong in some degree, but, coupled with it, the absence of
power, resulting from a disordered mind, to successfully resist the
6. Mens rea means a guilty mind. It is used in the criminal law to refer to the element
of mental state or intent. For a discussion of the development of mens rea, see Sayre, Mens
Rea, 45 HARv. L. REV. 974 (1932).
7. S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 123-38 (1925).
8. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). After debate in the House of Lords,
the Lords asked five questions of the judges in an attempt to arrive at a general standard.
Id. at 720.
9. Id. at 722.
10. M'Naghten introduced evidence that he believed himself to be persecuted by
Prime Minister Peel. Witnesses testified to his insanity, although some had not seen him
until he appeared in court. Id. at 719.
11. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 49-50.
[Vol. 45
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impulse to do the criminal act.""
Advances in psychiatric theory coupled with criticisms of the
M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests' 3 led Judge Bazelon of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in 1954, to formulate an even broader standard. In Dur-
ham v. United States,'4 the court adopted the rule that there was
no criminal responsibility if the "unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect." This new rule allowed the jury a
wide range of inquiry to determine "simply whether the accused
acted because of a mental disorder, and not whether he displayed
particular symptoms ....'"
Although hailed in some quarters as a more enlightened view,
Durham was also criticized as vague and ineffective. Consequently,
it was not widely adopted.'" In 1972, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit' 7 and Judge Bazelon himself (then Chief Judge) rejected Dur-
ham in favor of the American Law Institute (ALI) test.'5 The ALI
test states: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law."' 9
The ALI standard added the element of "appreciation" and
expanded the earlier tests. The language of the ALI test indicates
that the defendant must have an understanding or emotional reali-
zation of the wrongfulness of his conduct. 0 This is broader than
the mere knowledge required by the M'Naghten test. The defen-
dant need not be unable to control his behavior, but only has to
show that he "lacks substantial capacity" to act in a lawful man-
ner. This portion of the test excuses impulsive behavior at a some-
what less than irresistible standard. All federal jurisdictions and
about half the states have adopted the ALI test." This standard
12. State v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 371, 59 P. 169, 174 (1899).
13. See, e.g., Smith, Insanity and the Criminal Law in Montana, 8 MONT. L. REV. 1
(1947).
14. 214 F.2d 862, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
15. Id. at 876.
16. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 92. See also S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 94-
103 (1962).
17. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
18. Id. at 1010 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The bracketed word
"wrongfulness" was inserted "to indicate an option in the choice of words." Id. note on
status of section.
20. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 87.
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was used in Hinckley."
The United States Supreme Court has never adopted a partic-
ular test for insanity. Moreover, it has not explicitly determined
that an accused person has the right to an insanity defense, al-
though at least three state courts have declared that it would vio-
late due process to deprive a defendant of the defense of insanity. s
B. In Montana
The M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests were judicially
adopted in Montana in 1899.24 Confusion soon arose as to whether
insanity was a question of law or fact,26 and whether the defendant
had to prove insanity before asserting irresistible impulse.26 In
1967, the Montana Legislature accepted the ALI test, changing the
phrase "lacks substantial capacity" to "is unable. ' 2 7 This change in
the wording imposed a greater burden on the defendant than the
ALI standard.2
In 1979, the ALI test was shifted to the sentencing statutes;
the definition of mental disease or defect and all reference to
mental disease or defect as an affirmative defense were stricken.2 9
L. REP. 136, 142 (1983).
22. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (D.D.C. 1981).
23. State v. Lange, 168 La. 957, 123 So. 639 (1929); Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142,
132 So. 581 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
24. State v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59 P. 169 (1899).
25. State v. Keerl, 29 Mont. 508, 75 P. 362 (1904).
26. Note, Insanity as a Defense in the Criminal Law of Montana, 1 MONT. L. REv. 69
(1940). See also Smith, supra note 13; Note, Determination of Insanity-Old Problem Re-
quires a New Approach, 25 MONT. L. REV. 151 (1963).
27. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-501 (1947). The commission comment to this section
says, "It is felt that this section provides as simple and as positive a test as is possible at the
present time for separating the truly mentally irresponsible from the 'criminal' without the
invitation to the abuse of the 'defense of sanity' that is inherent in the indefinite language of
many tests of criminal responsibility."
28. State ex rel. Krutzfeldt v. District Court, 163 Mont. 164, 172, 515 P.2d 1312, 1316
(1973).
29. Act of May 14, 1979, ch. 713, 1979 Mont. Laws 1979. Before the Act, MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-14-101 (1978) provided:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he is unable either to appreciate the crimi-
nality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this chapter, the term "mental disease or defect" does not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or other antisocial conduct.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-201 (1978) provided:
(1) Mental disease or defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative defense
which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence.
(2) Evidence of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility is not admissible
unless the defendant, at the time of entering his plea of not guilty or within 10
days thereafter or at such later time as the court may for good cause permit, files
a written notice of his purpose to rely on such defense.
136 [Vol. 45
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The abolition of mental disease or defect as an affirmative defense
was not triggered by a particular incident, but was apparently an
attempt to curtail the role of the mental health professional in
criminal trials.30 The statutory changes shifted the focus on the de-
fendant's mental condition from the trial phase to the sentencing
phase of the process. The only relevant inquiry at trial is whether
the defendant had the state of mind that is an element of the of-
fense.3" This attempt at simplification has created some confusion.
III. REMAINING STATUTORY REFERENCES TO MENTAL DISEASE OR
DEFECT
The removal of the test for insanity from section 46-14-101 of
the Montana Code Annotated left only the portion of that statute
which says, "As used in this chapter, the term 'mental disease or
defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only by re-
peated criminal or other antisocial conduct."32 Although the 1979
amendments removed all reference to the affirmative defense of
mental disease or defect, they left section 46-14-102 intact. That
section, adopted in 1967, provides that "[e]vidence that the defen-
dant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible when-
ever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a
state of mind which is an element of the offense."33
(3) The defendant shall give similar notice when, in a trial on the merits, he in-
tends to rely on a mental disease or defect to prove that he did not have a particu-
lar state of mind which is an essential element of the offense charged. Otherwise,
except on good cause shown, he shall not introduce in his case in chief expert
testimony in support of that defense.
(4) When the defendant is acquitted on the ground of mental disease or defect
excluding responsibility, the verdict and the judgment shall so state.
The 1979 Act eliminated § 46-14-101(1) and § 46-14-201(1), and used the language of the
ALl test in a new sentencing statute, § 46-14-311.
30. The sponsor of the legislation, Representative Michael Keedy, testified that psy-
chiatrists were making "arbitrary and God-like determinations" and, along with social work-
ers, they "should be removed from the criminal justice process." Insanity Defense Loses
First Battle, The Missoulian, Feb. 21, 1979, at 14, col. 1. See also Insanity Defense Scut-
tled, The Missoulian, Feb. 24, 1979, at 5, col. 4. According to another source, Keedy was
influenced by the work of psychiatrist Thomas Szasz. Testimony Concerning the Insanity
Defense Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1982) (statement of
John H. Maynard, Assistant Attorney General, Montana). Szasz postulates that "there is
and can be no such thing as mental illness or psychiatric treatment." T. SZASZ, THE MYrH
OF MENTAL ILLNESS xii (1974). Szasz advocates the abolition of the insanity defense. His
theories are discussed in Robitscher & Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EM-
oRY L. J. 9, 38-42 (1982).
31. J. Maynard, Remarks at ATLA Seminar on the Insanity Defense, University of
Montana Law School (Feb. 23, 1983) (recording available from University of Montana In-
structional Materials Service).
32. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101 (1983).
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Under present law, then, a defendant claiming mental disease
or defect may still raise that issue to rebut the prosecution's evi-
dence of mental state. Technically this sort of attack on mental
state has always been available.14 Before 1979, however, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court would not allow use of this statute for a de-
fense of mental disease or defect. It held that such a defense had
to be proven under the affirmative defense statute by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 6
Mental state is an element of all but the most minor crimes.3 6
In Montana criminal responsibility requires a mental state of
"knowingly," "purposely," or "negligently." ' 7 The United States
Supreme Court has held, in In re Winship,35 that due process re-
quires the state to prove every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In Mullaney v. Wilbur"9
the Court further held that requiring the defendant to disprove an
element of the crime violated due process. The defendant in that
case challenged a Maine statute that established malice afore-
thought as an element of homicide. The state was not required to
prove malice, which was, in effect, presumed. If the defendant
wanted to reduce the crime to manslaughter, he had to disprove
malice by showing that he acted "in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation."' 0 The Court in Mullaney said that Winship would
prevent the state from shifting the burden to the defendant in this
fashion.4
By treating the defendant's evidence of mental disease or de-
fect as rebuttal evidence and eliminating any burden of proof on
the defendant, the state can avoid the claim that the defendant is
being required to disprove an element of the crime.2 Whether the
state has succeeded in proving all facts establishing mental state
beyond a reasonable doubt is a question for the jury to decide. If
34. Maynard, supra note 31.
35. State v. Caryl, 168 Mont. 414, 425, 543 P.2d 389, 395 (1975). See also State v.
Olson, 156 Mont. 339, 344, 480 P.2d 822, 824 (1971).
36. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
2-103 (1983).
37. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(33), (37), (58), 45-2-103 (1983). See also Note, A
Primer on the Element of Mental State in the Montana Criminal Code of 1973, 37 MONT.
L. REv. 401 (1976).
38. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
39. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
40. Id. at 687.
41. Id. at 703-04.
42. M. Greeley, Attorney General for the State of Montana, Memo to County Attor-
neys Re: House Bill 877-Laws of Montana (1979) Chapter 713, at 4 (October 24, 1979)
(available from the Montana Legislative Council).
[Vol. 45
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the jury has a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's ability to
have the required mental state, the defendant should prevail.
Under former law, the affirmative defense of mental disease or
defect placed a double burden on the defendant. First, he had to
produce enough evidence to raise the issue of insanity.43 Second,
the accused had to establish the defense by a preponderance of the
evidence." In Patterson v. New York4" the Supreme Court held
that it did not violate due process for a state to place both the
burdens of production and persuasion on the defendant who as-
serts an affirmative defense. The Court emphasized that, while the
state always has the burden of proving all the facts constituting
the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the state is not re-
quired to prove the non-existence of all the affirmative defenses
which it chooses to recognize.46 While the 1979 amendments may
have narrowed the scope of the insanity defense, they also lessened
the burden of proof born by the defendant.
In all states there is a rebuttable presumption that the defen-
dant is sane.47 The presumption prevails unless the defendant pro-
duces enough evidence to put sanity into issue. The Montana
Rules of Evidence require a defendant to overcome a disputable
presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.48 In Sandstrom
v. Montana41 the Supreme Court held that such a requirement
shifted both the burdens of production and persuasion to the de-
fendant. This was found to be constitutionally unacceptable if it
43. State v. Neel, 177 Mont. 93, 580 P.2d 456 (1978). "Some evidence" on each ele-
ment of the defense justified submitting it to the jury. Id. at 96-97, 580 P.2d at 458.
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-201(1) (1978) (repealed 1979).
45. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). In Patterson the defendant claimed that requiring him to
prove mitigating factors to reduce a homicide charge to manslaughter unconstitutionally
placed the burden on him of disproving an element of the crime charged.
46. Id. at 210. See generally Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden
of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979).
47. Note, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to
the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U.L. REv. 499, 502 (1976). For a discussion of pre-
sumptions generally, see Ranney, Presumptions in Criminal Cases: A New Look at an Old
Problem, 41 MONT. L. REv. 21 (1980).
48. MONT. R. EvID. 301(b)(2) provides:
All presumptions, other than conclusive presumptions, are disputable presump-
tions and may be controverted. A disputable presumption may be overcome by a
preponderance of evidence contrary to the presumption. Unless the presumption
is overcome, the trier of fact must find the assumed fact in accordance with the
presumption.
49. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). In Sandstrom, the Supreme Court held that this rule with
regard to the presumption that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of his volun-
tary acts" could have shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. It would violate due
process to require a defendant to disprove a fact essential to establishing an element of the
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could shift the burden to the defendant of disproving a fact estab-
lishing an essential element of the crime charged. Since sanity is
probably essential to mental state in most cases,5" it would violate
Sandstrom to require more than that a defendant introduce some
evidence to defeat the presumption and raise the issue of mental
disease or defect.
Once the issue of sanity has been raised, some commentators
feel that the burden should be on the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant is sane.51 This is a require-
ment in the federal courts imposed by an early case, Davis v.
United States.52 The analysis in Davis reasons that sanity is a fact
so essential to mental state that it becomes part of the element
which must be proven by the prosecution." The Montana court
has, however, rejected this position.
In State v. Doney54 a defendant was accused of attempted de-
liberate homicide and attempted robbery. He relied on expert tes-
timony to show that he was incapable of acting purposely and
knowingly. Doney was convicted of attempted robbery and the
lesser included offense of aggravated assault, but found not guilty
of attempted deliberate homicide. On appeal he claimed that, be-
cause he had proven his inability to form mental state by his "con-
50. One criticism of the new law is that a person could be seriously mentally ill, but
still capable of acting knowingly and purposely. This criticism could apply to the facts in
Hinckley. If the defendant acted with the purpose to kill President Reagan, he could be
found guilty under Montana law, regardless of his mental disability.
51. Note, The Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials-Burden of Proof, 10 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1037, 1055 (1976). See also, Comment, Mens Rea, Due Process and the Burden of
Proving Sanity or Insanity, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 113, 132 (1977).
52. 160 U.S. 469 (1895). An argument can be made that since Montana no longer al-
lows insanity as an affirmative defense, the prosecution must now prove sanity as an ele-
ment of the crime. In State v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59 P. 169 (1899), the Montana Supreme
Court specifically adopted Davis and approved the language in Davis to the effect that the
defendant only had to raise a reasonable doubt to overcome the presumption of sanity. Peel,
23 Mont. at 374, 59 P. at 175. This was the law until 1925 when the Legislature declared
that insanity had to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. MONT. REV. CODES §
10728(2) (1935). A later case distinguished Davis on the grounds that "[iln contrast to the
federal system, however, mental disease or defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative
defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Neel,
177 Mont. 93, 96, 580 P.2d 456, 458 (1978). Since insanity is no longer an affirmative de-
fense, the distinction is no longer valid.
53. But see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1950). The Supreme Court held that an
Oregon statute requiring that a defendant prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt did
not violate due process just because Oregon did not follow the procedure adopted by the
federal courts. Discussing Leland, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that "the existence or non-
existence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of
the required mental elements of the crime." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
54. - Mont. -, 636 P.2d 1377 (1981).
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vincing 'uncontroverted' expert testimony," the state was obliged
to overcome this evidence by proving sanity as well as mental
state.5" The court disagreed:
It is sufficient that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of the mental state that is an essential element of each
of the offenses charged. Implicit in the jury's conviction is its con-
clusion that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state,
and therefore had the capacity to form that mental state. The
State has met the requirements of Montana law. 6
Since the 1979 amendments to the law, a person who claims
(under section 46-14-102) that mental disease or defect prevented
formation of mental state no longer must prove insanity by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. After introducing some evidence to
raise the issue of sanity, the defendant need only raise a reasonable
doubt as to his mental state at the time of the offense in the minds
of the jurors. The defendant may, however, introduce additional
evidence as to his mental condition at the sentencing hearing.
Under section 46-14-311 the sentencing court can consider "any
relevant evidence presented at the trial and . ..such additional
evidence as it considers necessary" to determine if the convicted
defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect."
This provision in the statute was apparently intended to re-
move much of the expert testimony from the consideration of the
jury and shift it to the sentencing court. The judge is presumably
better able to evaluate such evidence. This provision may be weak-
ened, however, by the court's interpretation of section 46-14-102 in
State v. McKenzie.58 In that case, decided after passage of the
1979 amendments but under former law, the court characterized
section 46-14-102 as a "codification of the 'diminished capacity' de-
fense." 59 Jurisdictions adopting diminished capacity have found
that it "has one major defect: it opens the courtroom doors to vir-
tually unlimited psychiatric testimony."60 Recognition of this de-
fense would bring the expert testimony back into the trial setting.
55. Id. at -, 636 P.2d at 1382.
56. Id.
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-311 (1983).
58. - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 428, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1050 (1980).
59. Id. at -, 608 P.2d at 452.
60. Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two
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IV. RELATED DEFENSES UNDER CURRENT MONTANA LAW
A. Diminished Capacity Due to Mental Disease or Defect
In McKenzie the court held that evidence of mental disease or
defect was admissible for two statutory defenses. 1 One was the
"legal insanity" defense eliminated by the 1979 amendments. The
other was the diminished capacity defense. The court said that a
defendant who suffered from a mental disease or defect that was
insufficient to establish the complete defense of insanity could use
the diminished capacity defense to show that, while he lacked the
capacity to form the intent to kill, he could form the intent to
commit a lesser offense.62 The court held that diminished capacity
was an affirmative defense that had to be proven by the defendant
by a preponderance of the evidence.6 3
This raises the question of whether mental disease or defect,
under section 46-14-102, is currently available as both an attack on
the state's proof of mental state where the defendant can succeed
by raising a reasonable doubt, and a separate affirmative defense
that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. State
prosecutors have interpreted the statute to mean the former. 4 The
latter injects confusion into the law.
Diminished capacity has traditionally been used to assert that
a legally sane defendant lacked the "specific intent" required for
the crime charged, e.g. malice aforethought, premeditation, or de-
liberation, 5 and was therefore less guilty. These elements of spe-
cific intent were used to distinguish degrees of serious crime such
as homicide. The 1967 revisions of Montana's criminal code elimi-
nated the degrees of homicide and now Montana requires mental
states of "knowingly" and "purposely" for most crimes.6 Under
these circumstances, diminished capacity would seem to have little
application in Montana.
A diminished capacity defense will not help a defendant un-
less he can prove that mental disease or defect prevented him from
acting knowingly or purposely. Diminished capacity results only in
conviction of a lesser crime and must be proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. It would be a better choice for a defendant
61. McKenzie, __ Mont. at -, 608 P.2d at 452.
62. Id. at -, 608 P.2d at 453.
63. Id. at __, 608 P.d at 454.
64. Maynard, supra note 31.
65. McKenzie, - Mont. at -, 608 P.2d at 452.
66. Id. at -, 608 P.2d at 453. For the purposes of this article the mental state of
negligently has not been considered.
[Vol. 45
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who has some evidence of mental disease or defect to make a
straightforward attack on mental state, where he would only need
to raise a reasonable doubt as to his ability to act knowingly or
purposely.
The court in McKenzie described diminished capacity as an
alternative to the insanity defense. 7 It would be fair to assume
that the abolition of the affirmative defense of mental disease or
defect would change the nature of the diminished capacity defense.
It is difficult to argue that a defendant who was "aware" that it
was "highly probable that such a result would be caused by his
conduct,"68 could be found to lack the intent to cause that result.
The court in State v. Doney, however, quoted the McKenzie dis-
cussion of the diminished capacity defense to answer "the question
whether a jury could reasonably have concluded defendant was
precluded by mental disease or defect from formulating a con-
scious purpose to kill, yet was still capable of formulating a con-
scious purpose to frighten or injure."6 The court concluded that
the jury could have decided that the defendant meant to frighten
his victim, but was incapable of forming the intent to kill.
B. Diminished Capacity Due to Intoxication
In a confusing development, some recent cases indicate that
the defense of diminished capacity due to intoxication or drugged
condition may be merging with that of mental disease or defect.
Involuntary intoxication or drugged condition is still a bar to crim-
inal responsibility if the defendant has no "capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law."' 70 The defendant's condition can be considered
when determining mental state. 1
It should be noted that the language of the above statute is
identical to the test formerly used to determine sanity. In State v.
Ostwald72 the court held that when a defense of intoxication was
based on a claim of alcoholism, it then became a defense of mental
disease or defect. A later case, State v. Peavler,73 involved a defen-
67. McKenzie, - Mont. at -, 608 P.2d at 452.
68. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(33) (1983). The quoted language is from the defini-
tion of "knowingly" and describes the test for that level of intent. "Purposely" requires that
a person act with "conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result." MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(58) (1983).
69. Doney, - Mont. at -, 636 P.2d at 1384.
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1983).
71. Id.
72. 180 Mont. 530, 591 P.2d 646 (1979).
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dant who claimed that, because he was a chronic alcoholic, he had
no control over his drinking and was involuntarily intoxicated at
the time of an alleged burglary. In support of this claim defendant
attempted to introduce expert testimony to show that his "intoxi-
cated condition deprived him of his capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law."'74 Following Ostwald, the court held that the
district court had properly excluded the expert testimony. Since
Peavler based his defense on expert testimony as to the effects of
alcoholism, it became a defense of mental disease or defect under
the statutes. Peavler could not rely on the old test of ability to
appreciate criminality or to conform conduct because the 1979
amendments abolishing the affirmative defense of mental disease
or defect had eliminated those standards-even though the intoxi-
cation statute was unchanged by the amendments. 75
C. Voluntary Act
In addition to the defense of diminished capacity, the court
may have recently recognized a new way for a defendant to assert
irresistible impulse or lack of control. Every offense must have the
element of voluntary act.7 Voluntary act has always been thought
to describe a physical movement rather than a conscious intellec-
tual choice. 7 In State v. Zampich, 8 the defendant contended that,
although he was able to act purposely and knowingly, he was not
acting with " 'moral control' (voluntarily). That is, he might have
been acting with cognition and without volition" due to various
physical and emotional problems.7 In support of this contention
the defendant introduced expert testimony. He appealed his con-
viction on the ground that the trial court refused to instruct the
jury that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant had "acted knowingly, purposely and voluntarily."80
Although the supreme court rejected that instruction and af-
74. Id. at 380-81, 636 P.2d at 270.
75. Id. at 381, 636 P.2d at 271.
76. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-202 (1983).
77. Although the code does not define voluntary act, it does limit "involuntary act" to
"(a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; (c) con-
duct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; or (d) a bodily movement that
otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual." MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(31) (1983). By implication voluntary act has meant
a physical movement. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-202 (1983) commission comments.
78. __ Mont. -, 667 P.2d 955 (1983).
79. Id. at -, 667 P.2d at 957.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
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firmed the defendant's conviction, language in the decision may in-
dicate that psychological evidence is acceptable as proof of volun-
tary act. The court said:
Instruction No. 6 as given by the trial court, stated: "A material
element of every offense is a voluntary act." Section 45-2-202,
MCA. That instruction properly called the jury's attention to the
psychological evidence defense counsel had marshalled. Instruc-
tions No. 2 and No. 5 stated that the State of Montana has the
burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt .... [I]t is clear the jury was properly instructed regarding
defendant's theory of the case."1
Psychological testimony is not relevant to proof of a mere
physical movement. Testimony of this nature can be used to ex-
plain the reasons for the act and should be allowed only to show
that the defendant acted knowingly or purposely.




Testimony by mental health professionals is essential to a de-
fense of mental disease or defect. As previously noted, problems
with expert testimony spurred the abolition of the affirmative de-
fense. 82 Underlying most of the objections to psychiatric testimony
is the concern that the jury function will be usurped by the expert.
Critics fear that the jury will be confused by jargon and may give
expert testimony undue weight in reaching a verdict. Elimination
of the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect has not, how-
ever, eliminated expert testimony.83
81. Id.
82. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Psychiatric evidence has been criticized
as imprecise and speculative. McKenzie, - Mont. at __, 608 P.2d at 455. Some observ-
ers ask if the experts can be truly impartial or whether there is "a tendency to espouse the
cause of the party by whom they are called." State v. Noble, 142 Mont. 284, 307, 384 P.2d
504, 516 (1963) (Doyle, J., dissenting). A more cynical view asserts that insanity is a rich
man's defense, success depending on the quality of testimony that the defendant can afford
to buy. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 277 (1968).
83. One commentator has said, "You can change the name of the game, but you can-
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2. In Defendant's Case-in-Chief
Procedurally, the expert's role is governed by statute. If the
defendant is planning to use a defense of mental disease or defect
in his case-in-chief, he must give notice."' The court must then ap-
point a psychiatrist to examine the defendant and report on his
mental state.8 5 The supreme court has held that as long as the de-
fendant is examined by a psychiatrist, the spirit of the law has
been "substantially fulfilled. '86
To facilitate this examination, the court may order the defen-
dant to be committed to a "hospital or other suitable facility" for
up to sixty days. 7 In State v. Buckman8 the supreme court held
that Montana State Prison will be considered a suitable facility
unless the defendant shows that it is not. Hearsay evidence that
the prison is unsuitable was held to be insufficient.8 9
The examination has a dual purpose. First, the expert is to
determine if the defendant is competent to stand trial. Second, the
defendant's capacity to have the requisite mental state may be
evaluated. 0 In order to testify to the defendant's mental condition
at trial, an expert must have examined the accused.9' Although the
question of whether the defendant actually had the state of mind
required is a question of fact for the jury,9 2 the expert may give an
opinion as to the ability of the defendant to have a particular state
of mind. 3
3. The Rebuttal Witness
An expert may always testify without notice to rebut the pros-
ecution's evidence of mental state.9 ' In one case, where the prose-
cution had no notice, the court reversed a conviction on the ground
that refusal to admit the defendant's expert testimony deprived
the defendant of a fair trial.95
84. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-201 (1983).
85. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-202(1) (1983).
86. State v. Buckman, - Mont. -, 630 P.2d 743, 746 (1981).
87. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-202(2) (1983).
88. - Mont. -, 630 P.2d 743 (1981).
89. State v. Ritchson, __ Mont. -, 630 P.2d 234, 239 (1981).
90. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-203 (1983). Under former law only the defendant could
raise the question of his or her fitness to proceed. A 1983 amendment now permits the
county attorney to raise the issue as well. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221(1) (1983).
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-213(1) (1983).
92. State v. Hagerud, 174 Mont. 361, 370, 570 P.2d 1131, 1136 (1977).
93. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-213(2) (1983).
94. State v. Fish, - Mont. - , 621 P.2d 1072, 1078 (1980).
95. Id. In Fish, the court held that even if notice was not given, a defendant could not
be denied his right to rebut an essential element of the crime charged.
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Elimination of the definition of mental disease or defect also
eliminated the guidelines as to what testimony is relevant. There
are no standards for judges to follow. This may leave the door open
for development of a judicially made test of mental disease or
defect.
There will probably be less evidence allowed than formerly
with regard to the defendant's mental state at the time of the of-
fense. The more removed the evidence is from the time of the
crime, the more difficult an accurate diagnosis becomes.' 6 It is not
clear, however, how far the courts will go in allowing testimony
with regard to the defendant's ability to have a certain mental
state. A great deal of evidence regarding the defendant's back-
ground and personality could be allowed to show ability or lack of
it.
The introduction of diminished capacity and voluntariness
into consideration of mental state may mean previously inadmissi-
ble testimony may now be allowed. As noted above, the supreme
court apparently found no problem with psychological testimony
supporting the defendant's lack of "moral control."'"
C. Verdict
The 1979 Act provided for a special verdict form to be used
when a defendant is found not guilty by reason of a mental disease
or defect that prevented him from having the requisite mental
state.' 8 This may be in conflict with the requirement in another
statute that the verdict in all cases must be general.9"
D. Disposition
1. In General
One of the purposes of the Act abolishing the affirmative de-
fense was to provide an alternative sentencing procedure. The pro-
cedure to be followed varies depending on whether the defendant
is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, or is
found guilty but then raises the issue of mental disease to be con-
sidered in sentencing. There are problems associated with both
96. State v. Olson, 181 Mont. 323, 328, 593 P.2d 724, 727 (1979).
97. State v. Zampich, - Mont. - , 667 P.2d 955 (1983).
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-201 (1983).
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procedures.
2. If Not Guilty Due to Mental Disease or Defect
If a defendant succeeds in showing that he could not have the
required mental state due to mental disease or defect, the criterion
determining disposition is dangerousness to others. If the defen-
dant is found to be a danger, then he is "committed to the custody
of the superintendent of the Montana state hospital to be placed
in an appropriate institution for custody, care, and treatment."100
If a defendant is suffering from a mental illness and is not pro-
vided with adequate treatment, he may well have grounds to argue
constitutional violations of due process0 and cruel and unusual
punishment.102
A defendant so committed receives a hearing within 180 days.
Since the person has been found not guilty, if he can prove by a
civil standard-preponderance of the evidence-that he is no
longer dangerous, then he must be released. 03 The release may be
conditional within certain limits. Conditions that are unconstitu-
tional or punitive cannot be included in the release.'0 4 The court
has held that a woman found not guilty under the former law
could not have supervision by the Parole Division imposed upon
her as a condition of release. 0 5 The type of supervision sounded
too much like conditions that would be imposed on a criminal
parolee.
3. If Convicted on a Verdict or Plea of Guilty
If a convicted felon is found by the court at the sentencing
hearing to be suffering from a mental disease or defect, then com-
mitment is part of the sentence. The term is limited to the maxi-
mum that could be imposed under the regular sentencing stat-
ute,108 but an abnormally long period of incarceration could
100. Mo r. CODE ANN. § 46-14-301(2) (1983).
101. Federal courts have held that involuntarily committed persons have a right to
treatment for their illness. In Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), this right
was extended to a person found not guilty by reason of insanity. Chief Judge Baelon
pointed out that a shortage of staff or facilities would not be an excuse for denial of treat-
ment. Id. at 457-58. See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
102. State v. Mercer, - Mont. - 625 P.2d 44, 51 (1981).
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-301(3) (1983). See also Olson, 181 Mont. at 330, 593
P.2d at 731.
104. Zion v. Xanthopoulos, 178 Mont. 468, 472, 585 P.2d 1084, 1087 (1978).
105. Id. at 476, 585 P.2d at 1090.
106. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-312 (1983). Instead of an automatic hearing, the stat-
ute provides that the defendant may petition for review if a professional certifies that he or
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Convicts serving time in the state prison have the opportunity
to accumulate "good time," which results in shortening their
sentences.10 7 A convict who is found to be mentally ill and sent to
the state hospital cannot accumulate good time. He also cannot be
completely released from confinement or supervision before his
original sentence would have terminated. 10 8 If a convict recovers,
he could be sent to the prison to finish his sentence. Either way,
the mentally ill convict may very well be incarcerated longer than
a person with a similar sentence who is not ill and is able to accu-
mulate "good time."
Critics of the sentencing procedure have pointed out that
neither the prison nor the state hospital has facilities for dealing
with the very dangerous criminally insane. Psychotic criminals who
can form intent are being sent to the prison where they cannot be
treated.10 9 Convicted criminals with a mental illness have no incen-
tive to recover as they will be sent to the prison if they are cured.
The 1979 Act made an attempt to provide fair treatment for men-
tally ill criminals, but the result may be inequitable and inade-
quate treatment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1979 no cases have reached the Montana Supreme Court
in which the defense of mental disease or defect has been success-
fully asserted. 110 Since there were few cases under the former law,
it is not yet clear if the 1979 Act has succeeded in restricting the
use of the defense. It is logical to conclude that the insanity de-
fense will never be totally abolished and that expert testimony on
she has been cured. At this point the sentencing court may make an order consistent with
the sentencing statute but may not release the defendant completely any time before the
original sentence would have terminated. Section 46-14-313 provides that the defendant
cannot be kept in confinement past the expiration of the sentence without civil commitment
proceedings.
107. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-30-105 (1983).
108. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-312(3) (1983).
109. W. Stratford, Remarks at ATLA Seminar on the Insanity Defense, University of
Montana Law School (February 23, 1983) (recording available at University of Montana
Instructional Materials Service).
110. There are several possible reasons for this. First, the very ill defendant will prob-
ably be found to be too incapacitated to stand trial at all. Second, the prosecution may be
willing to plea bargain if it is quite clear that the defendant will be able to assert mental
disease or defect successfully. Finally, at the trial court level, defendants may not be pre-
vailing in their assertions of insanity. In two recent cases, for example, a defendant who
claimed to have an uncontrollable alternative personality, and another who heard voices
telling him to kill, were both convicted. Korrell is Guilty, Jury Says, The Missoulian, Feb.
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mental health issues will not be completely eliminated. A defen-
dant always has the right to attack the state's proof of mental state
by raising a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors. The de-
fendant raising this defense will be allowed to use expert testi-
mony, but such testimony should be limited to evidence which will
assist the jury in determining if the defendant acted purposely and
knowingly. These terms are defined by statute and have been suffi-
ciently challenged so that case law provides relatively clear
guidelines.
The effect of the 1979 Act in limiting expert testimony at trial
is diluted by the defense of diminished capacity due to mental dis-
ease or defect. Allowing a defendant to raise this affirmative de-
fense to mental state opens the door to extensive expert testimony
and is not in keeping with the spirit of the new law. Also inappro-
priate under current law is the use of the voluntary act require-
ment to determine intent. This interpretation is not supported by
existing authority and should not be permitted.
The 1979 Act also provided an alternative sentencing proce-
dure for the convicted defendant who is found to be suffering from
mental disease or defect. In the case of a person who has been
found guilty, this new procedure could result in a longer period of
incarceration. In effect, a convicted defendant could be punished
for successfully raising mental disease or defect at sentencing. The
law should be amended to allow convicts committed to the state
hospital to accumulate "good time" in some way so that their time
served in an institution would be equal to that of convicted defen-
dants who are sent directly to the prison.
While the public must be protected, the mentally ill convict
has a right to treatment. If truly ill defendants are being sent to
prison and are unable to get treatment there, then the 1979 Act is
deficient and should be amended to address this problem.
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